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Abstract of Thesis Entitled: Research on China A-Share 
Stocks Within Urban Transit Sector 
In this paper, we make a comprehensive analysis on the urban transit sector in China 
A-share market. We analyze the institutional background, and find that the stable 
revenue and profit margin and relatively predictable cash flow make this sector a 
"defensive" sector. The beta coefficients of the stocks in this sector are all below one. 
High payout ratio results in attractive dividend yield in China A-share market. 
Although there should be less IPO underpricing for this sector according to the 
signaling theory, the seven urban transit firms in China A-share market still offer a 
large IPO underpricing. By empirical test, we find that since the cash flow of this 
sector is relatively predictable, from time-series perspective, the stock return of urban 
transit portfolio is more related with the state variables regarding risk premium, 
compared with the whole market. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper aims at making a comprehensive analysis on one sector in China A-share 
market, the public transit sector. The public transit system mainly includes three modes of 
transportation, bus, rapid rail and taxicab. The seven listed corporations on China A-share 
market are all located in Beijing or Shanghai. 
The scope of this paper is as follows. 
• Institutional background: we analyze the regulatory environment, market structure, 
and business model for bus, rapid rail and taxi industry, as the basis for further 
analysis, in the first three sections of part two. 
• Stock market characteristics: we analyze the "defensive" characteristics for this sector, 
including beta coefficients, payout ratios, dividend yields, and IPO underpricing, in 
the fourth section of part two. 
• Explanatory variables for returns: based on the literature and the above analysis, we 
make empirical test to find out the state variables that could forecast the stock returns 
for this sector as compared with those that could forecast stock returns of the whole 
market, in part three. 
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2 Institutional Background 
Four tasks are taken in this part. First, we introduce the literature related to the urban transit 
sector, including public transit, namely bus and rapid rail, and taxi. Then we analyze the 
regulatory environment, market structure, as well as business model for these two sub 
sectors respectively. Based on this industrial knowledge, we are at the point to analyze the 
stock market characteristics of this sector. As a defensive sector with relatively predictable 
cash flow and stable earnings, the beta coefficients for the seven stocks are all below one, 
and these companies have high payout ratios, dividend yields, as well as high leverage 
ratios. Although the predictable cash flow should induce less IPO underpricing, according 
to the signaling theory, in China market, the IPO underpricing for this sector is still much 
more than that for the international counterparts. 
2.1 Literature Review 
The literature about public transit (bus and rapid rail) has been focusing on three aspects of 
this sector, the analysis of demand and supply, evaluation of efficiency aspects of pricing 
and investment, and measurement of the impact of government regulation on resource 
allocation and distribution in this subsector. 
In the demand analysis, the various components of service quality - travel time, comfort, 
reliability, etc.- are recognized as important attributes of a transportation mode. These 
features have led investigators to recognize that all individual users actually face a choice 
among various bundles of attributes when they consider which mode will maximize their 
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utility, and based on this, a number of demand function as well as the elasticity of demand 
with respect to price or service time are developed. 
Research on public transit supply has been primarily concerned with estimating firms' cost 
functions, especially determining whether scale economies exist in this industry. And this is 
sometimes offered as a justification for regulating the industry. In addition, there has been 
interest in estimating cost functions for the purpose of comparing the costs of particular 
modes. Comparative cost analyses are potentially useful in assessing whether public transit 
services are being provided at least cost to society and in identifying the traffic levels at 
which a particular mode may have a cost advantage over other modes. 
As for the analysis towards pricing and investment, initial efforts consisted of deriving 
"first-best" rules, recent work, however, has recognized that the necessary conditions for 
first-best rules to be useful in transportation (e.g., the absence of substantial scale 
economies and of government-induced price distortions in competing modes) may not be 
satisfied. Actually prices are widely believed to be held below marginal costs during peak 
periods. Thus, second-best rules have been developed. 
Early writings in the regulation area essentially described the specific regulations and their 
history, while recent literature has drawn upon some conceptual advances in cost and 
demand analysis and tried to quantify the welfare effects of various regulations and assess 
the likely impact and desirability of deregulation. In addition, researchers also analyzed the 
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efficiency implications of regulatory constraints on earnings in the public transit industries, 
as well as the tradeoffs that managers must make in terms of efficiency and distributional 
consequences, in attempting to achieve a particular goal for their company in a regulated 
environment. 
On the other hand, literature about taxi industry has primarily focused on the issues about 
regulation and the business model of taxi industry. 
As for the regulation, early researchers were interested in describing the regulatory 
environment in the taxi industry, that is, regulations on entry, fare, as well as 
quality-of-service, and found justifications for the regulations, which mainly include 
imperfect information and negative externalities. Later on, just like the research in public 
transit area, people devoted more time in analyzing the impact of taxi regulation, both 
theoretically and empirically, on consumer welfare, including fare level, waiting time, and 
quality of service, and estimating the possible deregulation measures. 
Based on the characteristics of demand and supply in taxi industry, researchers also 
estimated the taxi-related elasticities, the nature of competition in taxi market, the capacity 
utilization, as well as the model of taxi services. 
In this paper, we analyze the institutional background of public transit and taxi industry 
only for the purpose of further analysis of the financial statement features, the stock market 
performance, as well as the explanatory macroeconomic variables for the stock returns in 
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this sector. Therefore we focus primarily on the description of the institutional background, 
which determines the financial statement features for this sector, not on the transit 
economics. 
2.2 Public Transit Industry 
2.2.1 Regulatory Environment 
The players in Beijing and Shanghai public transit markets include SOEs, listed 
corporations, as well as private firms. 
I Table 1 ； Ownership Information of Listed Corporations 
Whether Controlling Owner is SOE, government, or not Controling Percentage 
DaZhong Transportation No 23.4% 
QiangSheng Holding No 32.9% 
BaShi Group Yes 31.0% 
ShenTong Subway Yes 63.7% 
Beijing Bus Group Yes 67.6% 
HaiBo Co. Ltd. Yes 37.9% 
Nanjing Zhongbei Yes 28.6% 
Source: Corporate Annual Reports 
All the firms are subject to three forms of regulation, output and network structure, fare and 
revenue, and entry and exit. 
Output and Network Structure Regulation: this set of constraints is the result of 
the specification, by the regulatory agency, of the transit firm's route network and 
level of service. The local regulatory agency, namely Transportation Commission, 
dictates the organization of the bus and rail line network in terms of the number of 
routes, their length and layout, points of origin and destination and the location of 
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stops. It also sets the minimum required frequency of service on each line as well as 
the hours of operation. Constraints on level of service, on the other hand, include 
vehicle type, size, total number of buses, as well as type of service (e.g., 
air-conditioning). 
•:• Fare and Revenue Regulation: Essentially, fare regulatory agency, namely Local 
Development and Reform Commission, determines fare level and structure in terms 
of distance, service type (buses with air conditioning or not) and user's eligibility for 
concessionary fare (e.g., elderly or students). Economic theory suggests that for 
allocative efficiency purposes, fare level and structure should reflect the marginal 
costs of providing particular services. Since marginal costs of service production vary 
primarily with the trip length and type, fares should vary accordingly. Because the 
fare changes every 5-6 years, in order to sustain the economic viability of these 
regulated transit firms, subsidizes are provide to cover the increase of the total costs, 
which we will elaborate in the 2.2.3 section. 
Entry and Exit Regulation: This is probably the most significant form of transit 
regulation relative to its impact on the structure of transit markets. Essentially, this 
regulation aims at sustaining the monopolistic or oligopolistic status of existing 
transit systems by prohibiting new potential operators from entering the market and 
providing competitive transit services. At the same time, it disallows present 
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operators to discontinue service provision (the exit part of the regulation). This kind 
of regulation directly determines the current oligopoly market structure, which we 
will describe in the 2.2.2 section. 
In a word, public transit in Beijing and Shanghai is highly regulated industry in which 
public planning and control substitute for market forces in the provision of services. 
From an international perspective, public transit is even more regulated industry, which 
could be illustrated from table 1. In most western countries, the most prevailing regulatory 
regime is complete regulation, in which a publicly owned transit system or a licensed 
monopoly is the sole operator. Under this regime, the public subsidy mechanism guarantees 
that the goal of public transit is not profit. Since fare is low, the gap between fare box and 
costs is filled by government subsidy. 
Over one-third of the countries also try to use regulation with tendering to provide services, 
which removes entry regulation by allowing firms to compete for service contracts. Only a 
small number of countries presently allow regimes of partial deregulation. U.K is the only 
country allowing full deregulation. Under this regime, all the above three regulations are 
removed, and the players compete on the fare and service. The reform took place in 1985， 
within areas out of London. The resulting surging fares greatly reduced the patronage, 
which was believed to have hampered the social feature of public transit and therefore a 
failure from this perspective. 
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I Table 2: Transit Regulatory Regimes in 22 countries 
Country Regulatory Regime 
Complete Regulation 
Public Licensed Regulation with pa^ial Full Revenue-
Ownership " Monapol ^ Dereg.� Dereg. d Cost Ratio (%) 
Belgrium x 30-40 
Denmark x x 55 
Finland x x 50-65 
France x x 30-80 
Greece x 40-50 
Ireland x 80-95 
Holland x 30-40 
Israel x 65 
Italy X 25-30 
Norway x x 55-60 
Portugal X X 65 
Spain X x 50-60 
Sweden x x 30-40 
Switzerland x x 55-80 
Turkey x x NA 
UK X X X NA 
Germany x 55 
Yugoslavia X X NA 
U.S.A. X X 30-40 
Austrilia x NA 
New Zealand x NA 
Notes: a Publicly owned system with exclusive rights; ^ A licensed monopoly mainly in the large metropolitan areas of 
each country;*^  Partial deregulation; d Full deregulation; 
Sources: Anderson (1992); Himanen et al. (1990); Gwilliam and van de Velde (1990); Local Authorities. 
Economic theory suggests two principal reasons for the regulation of public transit market. 
Market Failure: (A) Externalities. An important form of externality in public transit 
occurs when various forms of government's subsidization of auto utilization in public 
areas promote auto trips and consequently may reduce transit use. On the other hand, 
the alleged capability of transit to restrain urban sprawl and auto travel is also 
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considered an externality. (B) Imperfect information. This occurs when costly 
information leads to high uncertainties and incorrect market decision. An example is 
the under-utilization of public transit caused by the absence of reliable and 
well-coordinated and publicized timetables. 
Income Distribution. Regulatory intervention is also rationalized as a way to affect 
income distribution and promote the mobility of disadvantaged groups. The 
consumption of some goods is considered by society as a basic civil right of all 
individuals, hence the term "merit good". Transport is alleged to be a merit good 
whose provision at affordable prices is regarded as the best way to assure its 
availability to all. And the economic regulation and subsidization is thus suggested as 
a means to assure the prices. Furthermore, the spatial mobility of some targeted 
groups, such as the elderly or physically disables persons, is also considered of such 
great social importance to justify their preferential treatment in the form of 
compensatory transit fares. 
2.2.2 Market Structure 
From the perspective of the whole urban transit market, bus occupies the dominant share in 
terms of passenger trips in Beijing and Shanghai, while rapid rail, under the current low 
network density, has the least market share. 
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I Table 3: Urban Transit Market Share of Different Modes 
Beijing Market 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Bus 77.4% 78.5% 79.8% 79.2% 79.0% 
Rapid Rail 9.3% 9.1% 8.7% 9.7% 10.7% 
Taxi 13.3% 12.4% 11.5% 11.1% 10.3% 
Shanghai Market 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Bus 73.6% 71.6% 68.9% 63.6% 62.3% 
Rapid Rail 3.8o/o 7.5% 8.9% 9.5% 10.5% 
Taxi 17.5% 16.5% 18.4% 23.5% 23.9% 
Sources: Beijing Statistics Yearbook, Shanghai Statitiscs Yearbook 
The intra-city bus market, both in Beijing and in Shanghai, presently is of typical 
characterization of oligopolistic competition. 
In Shanghai market, Bashi Group (ticker: 600741)，which mainly operates in the downtown 
area, occupies about sixty percent of market share in terms of passenger trip, while 
DaZhong Transportation (ticker: 600611), mainly operating in the suburban area, has a 
market share of about thirty percent. And this market structure has been stabilized since 
2003. Actually there used to be only one state-owned bus operator in Shanghai market, 
until government divided that company into 13 small SOEs in 1996. However, after the 
government-directed M&A activities during 1997-2000, the oligopoly structure finally 
turned out. 
Before the EPO of Beijing Bus Group (ticker: 600386) in 2001, there was also only one 
SOE, namely Public Transit Group, in the intra-city bus market. Currently Beijing Bus 
Group and Public Transit Group occupy 14% and 74% of the intra-city bus market, 
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respectively. 
Given the current intensive bus network density in Beijing and Shanghai, the regulatory 
agencies do not plan to add more bus routes. Therefore the passenger trip distribution 
between the current players in the given network will be relatively stable. That is, the 
oligopoly structure will persist at least in the near future. 
I Table 4； Oligopoly Market Structure in Bus Operation 
Shanghai Market Structure 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
BaShi Group 55.5% 54.8% 55.0% 56.8% 57.0% 
DaZhong Transportation 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 26.7% 28.0% 
Market share of major two 70.5% 69.8% 70.0% 83.5% 85.0% 
Beijing Market Structure 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Beijing Bus Group 5.6% 8.3% 11.2% 13.6% 13.9% 
Public Transit Group 91.9% 88.0% 83.1% 77.6% 75.0% 
Market share of major two 97.5% 96.3% 94.3% 91.1% 89.0% 
Sources: Beijing Statistics Yearbook, Shanghai Statitiscs Yearbook, Corporate Annual Reports 
Under regulation, the market structure is, to a large extent, the result of the particular 
regulatory regime and objectives of regulatory agencies given, of course, the spatial 
organization of the region including the demand for transit. In public transit industry, there 
are at least two kinds of economy that makes a complete competitive market less 
cost-efficient than a monopolistic or oligopolistic one. The characterization of the transit 
firm as a multi-product firm, which concurrently produces services on many routes, give 
rise to the economies of product scope, that is, the more efficient use of managerial skills, 
sales network and operational capital. Another type of economy, which also relates to the 
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network layout, is economies of network structure. This will be the case, for example, 
when the transit firm is able to swap labor or rolling stock between routes, either because 
the routes are in a hub-and-spokes network setting or because services are operated at 
different time frequencies so that the firm can use vehicles on one route for operation on 
another. On the other hand, the reason that the regulatory agencies in Beijing and Shanghai 
intended to leave the market oligopolistic, rather than monopolistic as it used to be, is that 
government wants to make comparison between operation results of different players to 
utilize subsidy more efficiently. 
Under the regulation-with-tendering regime, other international markets also tend to be 
oligopolistic. For example, the three major intra-city bus operators in Hong Kong market 
occupy 90% of market share. In 1960s, eleven companies competed in Singapore transit 
market. In 1973，government compelled them to merge into one company, and set up one 
new company at the same time, leaving the market oligopolistic. 
The rapid rail systems in Beijing and Shanghai are both operated by one local SOE, that is, 
rapid rail is a public-owned market. 
2.2.3 Demand，Revenue and Profit 
Intra-city bus service provides the basic mobility to residents, and the number of passenger 
trip has been growing at a steady rate, which is little bit higher than population growth rate 
but much lower than growth rate of per capita income, in the past years. As per capita 
income grows, people tend to have more trips than before, but not in a proportional way. 
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Now the regulatory agencies have adopted "Bus Priority" scheme, which allows the 
"exclusive lanes" for buses, and we anticipate that the total passenger trip will keep 
growing steadily. 
[~Table 5； Passenger Trip of Bus Service Increases at Steady Rate 
Shanghai Market Beijing Market 
Intra-City Bus _ , . „ ^ . , Intra-City Bus „ , Per Capita 
„ „ . Population Per Capita Income „ …. Population , 厂 广 丄 
Passenger Trip ^ , „ 广 , „ Passenger Trip ^ , „ ^ Income Growth 
„ 丄 „ Growth Rate Growth Rate ^ , „ ^ Growth Rate _ ‘ 
Growth Rate Growth Rate Rate 
1996 10.0% 9.5% 14.5% 4.5% 1.7% 10.8% 
1997 3.1% 4.3% 3.4% 5.1% 0.8% 13.8% 
1998 4.6% 2.1% 4.0% 7.4% 2.0% 14.5% 
1999 -2.7% 1.1% 24.6% 1.6% 2.2% 8.4% 
2000 9.5% 4.5% 7.2% -4.0% 2.2% 12.7% 
2001 1.3% 2.2% 9.9% 10.9% 6.9% 11.9% 
2002 3.4% -0.7% 2.8% 10.2% 9.4% 7.7% 
2003 -1.6% 5.3% 12.2% -12.6% -0.9% 11.4% 
2004 3.9% 0.6% 12.2% 16.5% 0.8% 12.6% 
Sources: Beijing Statistics Yearbook, Shanghai Statitiscs Yearbook 
On the other hand, due to urban expansion and the build-up of suburban satellite cities 
around Beijing and Shanghai, the passenger trips on the intra-city bus routes connecting 
suburban area and downtown area have been increasing at a much faster rate than the 
overall market. And since these routes are also operated by the above-mentioned intra-city 
bus operators, this rapid increase could contribute to the total revenue. 
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I Table 6： Suburban-Downtown Passenger Trip Growth Rate 
Shanghai Market Beijing Market 
^ „ , , 广 . ‘ n Suburban- ^ „ , 广. Suburban-
Overall Intra-City Bus ^ ^ , . Overall Intra-City ^ , . 
„ „ . ^ , Downtown Lines „ „ � D o w n t o w n Lines 
Passenger Trip Growth „ ^ . Bus Passenger ^ ^ . 
_ , Passenger Trip ^ . ^ , ^ Passenger Trip 
Rate 广 , ^ Trip Growth Rate ^ ^ 
Growth Rate ^ Growth Rate 
2000 9.5% 15.0% -4.0% 21.0% 
2001 1.3% 20.0% 10.9% 33.3% 
2002 3.4% 12.8% 10.2% 15.0% 
2003 -1.6% 9.7% -12.6% 7.8% 
2004 3.9% 15.4% 16.5% 55.3% 
Sources: Beijing Statistics Yearbook, Shanghai Statitiscs Yearbook 
In the long run, intra-city bus operation will face threat from two competitive modes. One 
is rapid rail, which presently carries the majority of passenger trip in western metropolitans, 
like New York, London and Paris. Rapid rail has the obvious advantages on speed and 
comfort over buses, while charging the similar prices at the same time, which will 
definitely hamper the patronage of buses. For example, compounded annual growth rate of 
passenger trips of buses in Hong Kong in the past five years is only 0.05%, while that of 
rapid rail is 2%. Another long-run competitive transportation mode is car, just like in 
Western Europe and U.S., greater car ownership will induce less use of public transit. 
Overall, the steady growth rate of patronage, combined with the regulated fare and 
oligopoly structure, determines that intra-city bus operator enjoys steady growth in 
revenue. 
To analyze the profit margin of bus operators, a deep investigation of the operation costs is 
required. Among the four major components of bus operation costs, fuel and employee cost 
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increases constitute the major reason that justifies subsidy, since depreciation and 
maintenance costs are normally related to the number of vehicles and tend to be stable. 
I Table 7； Operation Costs Components of Bus Operation 
BaShi Group DaZhong Transportation Beijing Bus Group 
Employee 33% 28% 37% 
Fuel 26% 26% 30% 
Depreciation 17% 17% 18% 
Maintenance 11% 15% 10% 
Sources: Corporate Annual Reports 
The profit margin of bus operation largely depends on policy, since the fare level, fuel price 
and subsidy are all determined by the government. Regulatory agencies tend to keep the 
profit margin of public transit within a range. On one hand, bus operators achieving higher 
or excess profit means fare level may be too high, and residents, especially those with 
lower income, have sacrificed for that. On the other hand, government will provide subsidy 
for the profit decrease due to the conflicts of stable fare and increasing costs, to ensure the 
economic viability of the bus operators. For example, regulatory agencies have established 
the fuel subsidy policy that could offset the surging fuel costs since 2003, to maintain the 
net profit margin of these bus operators. 
I Table 8： Net Margins of Bus Operators 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
BaShi Group 3.5% 3.5% 4.0% 3.8% 1.3% 2.5% 
DaZhong Transportation 3.0% 3.2% 2.9% 3.5% 1.1% 2.8% 
Beijing Bus Group 4.5% 4.0% 5.0% 5.0% -7.5% 4.5% 
Sources: Corporate Annual Reports 
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Rapid rail takes a majority role in the public transit market of the international 
metropolitans with similar population density as Beijing and Shanghai. Presently the rail 
network density, defined as the length of rapid rail divided by the urban area, is still very 
low in Beijing and Shanghai. In order to mitigate the current congestion on road, 
government has determined to invest in more rapid rail construction. And the passenger trip 
of rapid rail will increase at a higher rate than that of buses. 
I Table 9: Rapid Rail Network Density 
Toyko Paris New York London Hong Kong Shanghai Beijing 
Rapid Rail Network 
Density (kilometer/ square 2.0 2.0 1.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 
kilometer) 
Population 
Density(thousand 19.9 25.7 10.2 7.3 27.5 20.0 10.9 
people/square kilometer) 
Bus proportion in urban 6% 28% 32% 41% 62% 85% 88� /� 
transit 
Rapid Rail proportions 94% 孤 68% 59% 38% 15% U � / � 
urban transit 
Sources: Transport Statistics Great Britain, MTA annual report, CEIC,Beijing Statistics Yearbook, Shanghai Statistics Yearl 
Rapid rail operation is by itself not economically viable. Because the initial investment of 
rapid rail is huge (60-100 million USD/kilometer for subway, 25-50 million USD/kilometer 
for light rail), the lower fare level makes the payback period very long. Presently it is 
government who makes the investment and operates the rapid rail system, in Beijing and 
Shanghai as well as in most western countries. 
2.3 Taxi Industry 
2.3.1 Regulatory Environment 
Taxi industry is subject to less regulation compared with public transit industry. As part of 
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the urban transit, however, regulations on entry, fare, as well as quality-of-service are still 
implemented. 
Entry Regulation: there has been policies of restricting the number of taxi licenses 
issued by the local regulatory authorities in Beijing and Shanghai since mid of 1990s, 
the initial reason of which is to increase the occupancy rate (proportion of time that 
the taxis are occupied). Entry regulation actually represents a barrier to entry in to the 
market, and can therefore be expected to confer a degree of market power on those 
authorized to operate taxis, which, in the absence of price regulation, would enable 
them to charge higher prices than in a competitive situation. 
I Table 10； Entry Regulation on Taxi Markets 
Shanghai Market 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of Taxi Operated 38,428 39,041 39,923 40,806 43,796 44,202 44,803 45,000 
Growth Rate 7.9% 1.6% 2.3% 2.2% 7.3% 0.9% 1.4% 0.4% 
Occupancy Rate 55% 45% 50% 52% 53% 54% 56% 60% 
Beijing Market 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of Taxi Operated 59,902 61,301 61,920 65,127 65,155 66,759 65,984 52,000 
Growth Rate 5.1% 2.3% 1.0% 5.2% 0.0% 2.5% -1.2% -21.2% 
Occupancy Rate 45% 42% 50% 50% 52% 55% 53% 54% 
Sources: Beijing Statistics Yearbook, Shanghai Statistics Yearbook 
In the western world, entry regulation is universally implemented, though maybe with 
different measure. For example, in London there are no entry restrictions, as taxi driver 
licenses are issued to all applicants who pass the knowledge examination. However, the 
strictness of the knowledge examination represents a higher barrier to entry in the London 
market. 
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Entry restrictions are generally justified on the basis that taxi services impose two negative 
externalities: traffic congestion and air pollution. Another justification for entry restriction 
is based on the cost structure of the taxi industry, in particular the observation that the 
majority of costs incurred by taxi providers, including vehicle depreciation and fuel costs, 
are fixed and do not vary in relation to the taxi's occupancy rate. An increase in the number 
of taxis operating will, for a given level of demand, lower the occupancy rates. Therefore, 
in order to cover costs, the fares got to be raised or the industry got to be hampered. 
• Fare regulation: A cap is generally specified for each of the elements of the 
regulated fare: the fixed charge, the mileage charge and the charge per minute when 
the taxi is standing still. Different caps are also set for services at peak and off-peak 
times, often presented in terms of day/night fares. When entry is regulated, fare 
control generally results in the maximum prescribed fare being adopted as the 
standard fare by all taxi operators. 
In Europe and U.S. the government reviews fare increases annually, using a formula based 
on a range of taxi-specific costs and an index of earnings, while in Beijing and Shanghai, 
taxi fares are relatively stable, with changes every five to six years. 
Quality-of-service regulation: Minimum quality of service standards are set in 
relation to consumer safety (e.g., roadworthiness test, maximum vehicle ages, and 
driver training requirement), driver safety (i.e., the provisions of protective screens) 
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and service quality (i.e., tests of drivers' geographical knowledge). 
Fare and quality-of-service regulation is generally justified on that consumers may suffer 
from incomplete information in their use of taxi services. This results from their inability to 
purchase taxi services at fixed locations, which hampers their ability to make price 
comparisons. Better information on price could be obtained only by incurring search costs. 
On the other hand, it is also difficult for passengers to judge the standard of quality of a 
taxi service before they accept the ride. 
2.3.2 Business Model 
The taxi companies in Beijing and Shanghai are not "true operators" like the public transit 
counterparts, but rather "renters". That is, taxi company is the owner of both the license 
and the vehicle, while taxi driver rents the vehicle as well as the license from the taxi 
company, and pays fixed fees for that. Taxi drivers also bear the fuel costs. This business 
model could be illustrated by the following equation: 
NI + F = P*PT-FC 
Where NI denotes the net income of taxi drivers, F denotes the fixed rental fees, P denotes 
the average fare for each passenger trip, while PT denotes the number of passenger trip for 
the taxi, and FC denotes the fuel cost. Under this business model, any market risks, such as 
number of passenger trips, fare and fuel price, are assumed by the taxi drivers, while the 
companies get the fixed rental fee. 
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Therefore revenue of a taxi company largely depends on the number of taxis it operated 
and the rental fees it charged for each vehicle. Since there is strict entry regulation and the 
taxi market is now oligopolistic, which is illustrated in the next section, the former factor is 
relatively stable for each taxi company, and we focus the discussion on the rental fees. 
Although the rental fee is determined by each company, rather than by the regulatory 
agency, the difference between the fees of different companies is negligible. There are two 
reasons for that. One is there is little barrier for drivers jumping from one company to 
another. The other is it is relatively easy for several big companies to set a uniform fee 
standard in an oligopoly market. Because the number of passenger trip for taxis only 
increased at a steady rate in the past years on the ground of rapid car ownership growth, the 
fee charged has also stabilized at around 120 thousand/ per year in Shanghai market (there 
is no listed corporations in Beijing market). 
I Table 11； Stable Rental Fee in the Taxi Market 
Fees Charged Per Year Per Vehicle (Thousand RMB) 
Taxi Company (Shanghai Market) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
DaZhong Transportation (600611) 117 117 118 120 120 122 
QiangSheng Holdings (600662) 116 118 119 119 120 121 
BaShi Group (600741) 116 115 117 120 121 122 
JinJiang Investment (600650) 115 117 118 119 121 122 
HaiBo Co. (600708) 116 118 120 121 120 122 
Sources: Corporate Annual Reports 
Because the costs of taxi companies mainly include depreciation, fixed road fares, vehicle 
insurances, fleet management costs, which are all relatively stable for each vehicle, the taxi 
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companies enjoy relative high and stable profit margins. 
I Table 12； Stable Profit Margin in the Taxi Market 
Profit margin of taxi company 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Gross Margin 42-45% 43-45% 42-48% 44-46% 
Net Margin 16-18% 17-18% 17-19% 16-18% 
Sources: Corporate Annual Reports 
This kind of business model is also adopted by New York City, Singapore and Tokyo. In 
most European countries, however, the taxi drivers pay the license fees directly to the 
government, and they also need to buy the vehicles themselves. That is, there is no such a 
taxi company layer. 
2,3.3 Market Structure 
On the ground of entry regulation, after the M&A activities from 1997 to 2000, several 
major taxi companies have been occupying a large share of the market in Beijing and 
Shanghai since 2000. The largest five companies in Shanghai, which have all been listed, 
and the seven largest companies in Beijing have a combined market share of 63% and 60%， 
respectively. 
There are two rationales behind of this oligopoly structure. One is taxi operation, like all 
the other transportation market, enjoys economies of scale, in terms of managerial 
employees and general expenses sharing. The other is that regulatory agencies have the 
intention to push the merger between small firms to make this market much easier to 
regulate. Actually it was the rule of restricting taxi companies with the number of operated 
vehicles below one threshold that promoted great M&A activities in 1998 in Beijing 
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market. 
After years of merger, presently the number of purchasable licenses, defined as the licenses 
not owned by big firms or the associations of small firms, has been decreased rapidly. 
Therefore it is hard to conduct big scale acquisition. On the other hand, the remaining small 
firms operate more efficiently than those that were formerly acquired, which, combined 
with the decreased number of purchasable licenses, also make the acquisition prices 
surging in the past years. Therefore we anticipate that this oligopoly market could stabilize 
in the near future. 
I Table 13； Decreased number of purchasable licenses and surging acquisition price 
Shanghai Market 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
No. of Purchasable Licenses 23,425 23,954 20,403 17,518 11,051 9,857 9,000 
Average Acquisition Price (thousand 150 180 220 250 280 350 
RMB per license) 
Beijing Market 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
No. of Purchasable Licenses 36,781 30,960 29,307 16,289 14,687 13,197 9,360 
Average Acquisition Pnce (thousand ^^ 70 O^ 100 150 200 220 
RMB per license) 
Sources: Beijing Statistics Yearbook, Shanghai Statistics Yearbook, Corporate Annual Reports 
2.4 Defensive Industry 
Based on the above institutional background, urban transit sector could be classified as a 
"defensive sector" in the stock market, mainly because this sector has stable revenue and 
profit margin. 
•:• Stable revenue: 
a) Intra-city buses, rapid rail, as well as taxi all enjoy stable patronage; 
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b) Revenue per passenger trip is relatively stable because of the regulation for fare; 
c) Entry and exit regulation, which makes it a non-competitive industry, combined 
with economy of scale, results in the oligopoly structure. 
Stable profit margin: Urban transit operators rely on the subsidy to cove the 
increased fuel and employee costs, while taxi companies, as "renters", have stable 
profit margin because their operation costs are relatively stable for each vehicle, and 
therefore the profit from each vehicle is also stable. 
As a defensive sector with predictable earnings, the beta coefficients for the seven stocks 
are all below one. As a matter of fact, the beta coefficients of the urban transit companies in 
other stock markets are also below one. 
� T a b l e 14； Urban transit sector as a "defensive sector,， 
International Stocks Local Stocks 
Company Stock Market Adjusted Beta Company Adjusted Beta 
Kowloon Motor bus Hong Kong 0.51 DaZhong Transportation 0.82 
AMS Public Hong Kong 0.57 QiangSheng Holding 0.84 
Kwoon Chung bus Hong Kong 0.63 BaShi Group 0.85 
MTR Corp Hong Kong 0.88 ShenTong Subway 0.87 
Chunil Express South Korea 0.39 Beijing Bus Group 0.95 
Shinki Japan 0.29 HaiBo Co. Ltd. 0.98 
Daiwa Japan 1.17 Nanjing Zhongbei 0.98 
Hokkaido Japan 0.46 
Centris multipersada Indonesia 0.53 
Comfortdelgro Singapore 0.34 
Sbs transit Singapore 0.53 
National express UK 0.59 
First group UK 0.61 
Stagecoach UK 0.74 
Southern vectis UK 0.79 
Telling golden UK 1.04 
Laidlaw US 0.95 
Sources: Bloomberg 
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2.4.1 Cash Flow and Dividend 
The main capital expenditure of urban transit firms is vehicle turnover, or maintenance 
capex, and usually the depreciation could cover the capital expenditure due to two factors. 
One is the prices for vehicles have been relatively stable in the case of bus transit or kept 
decreasing in the case of taxi cars. The other is the depreciation period is usually set to 
equal to the usage period, that is, there is no under-depreciation or over-depreciation. 
Stable revenue and profit margin, together with the relation between depreciation and 
capex, determines that the free cash flow of urban transit firms is relatively stable, and the 
ratio of stock price divided by cash flow per share is not so high compared to the market. 
Due to the intensive regulation, the operation, earning, as well as cash flow of urban transit 
companies is all relatively stable. Therefore these companies are willing to payout a higher 
percentage of their net income as dividend, which results in a relatively attractive dividend 
yield (stock price/dividend per share) in the A-share market. 
I Table 15： Attractive Dividend Yield and Stock Price/CF per share 
DaZhong QiangSheng ShenTong Beijing Bus HaiBo Co. Nanjing 
Transportation Holding Subway Group Ltd. Zhongbei 
Stock price/cash flow 3 9 2.5 2.7 4.5 2.8 3.3 2.1 
per share 
Dividend Yield (current 
stock price/dividend per 3.3% 2.6% 1.3% 1.5% 2.8% 2.5% 1.4% 
share last fiscal year) 
Sources: Bloomberg, Corporate Annual Reports 
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I Table 16； Stable cash flow and high payout ratio 
^ ^ 2 m 2004 
Capex/Depreciation 
DaZhong Transportation 1.9 1.4 0.9 1.1 
QiangSheng Holding 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 
BaShi Group 1.5 1.7 1.3 1 
ShenTong Subway 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 
Beijing Bus Group 1.9 1.5 0.9 1.3 
HaiBo Co. Ltd. 1.5 1.2 1 1.3 
Nanjing Zhongbei 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.2 
Free Cash Flow (million RMB) 
DaZhong Transportation 175.0 181.0 165.7 189.0 
QiangSheng Holding 200.4 206.3 192.4 196.4 
BaShi Group 150.2 142.9 132.6 129.1 
ShenTong Subway 102.3 100.5 93.4 62.3 
Beijing Bus Group 143.7 184.8 156.6 140.5 
HaiBo Co. Ltd. 85.8 100.2 95.3 70.5 
Nanjing Zhongbei 89.8 75.6 87.3 80.4 
Payout Ratio (dividend/earning) 
DaZhong Transportation 57.5% 48.7% 61.1% 51.8% 
QiangSheng Holding 38.1% 82.9% 30.0% 45.0% 
BaShi Group 42.2% 41.1% 43.9% 45.2% 
ShenTong Subway 45.0% 47.5% 44.6% 48.9% 
Beijing Bus Group 64.1% 67.2% 60.5% 43.9% 
HaiBo Co. Ltd. 45.6% 46.7% 50.0% 42.3% 
Nanjing Zhongbei 50.3% 55.6% 45.7% 60.5% 
Sources: Corporate Annual Reports 
2.4,2 IPO Underpricing 
Ibbotson (1975) first rigorously documented the large underpricing of initial public 
offerings. In a survey paper, for instance, Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988) reported an 
average initial return of 16.37% for 8,668 new issues in 1960-1987. Many models trying to 
explain this phenomenon emerged in late 1980s. Among them are Rock (1986) "winner's 
curse" theory, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) "costly information acquisition" theory, as 
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well as the signaling theories, elaborated by Welch (1989)，Grinblatt and Hwang (1989)， 
and Allen and Faulhaber (1989). 
Rock (1986) ever offered an equilibrium model in which uninformed investors face a 
winner's curse when they submit an order for IPO shares. Since informed investors 
withdraw from the market when the issue is priced above its value, uninformed investors 
are more likely to receive a full allocation of shares if the offering is overpriced and a 
rationed allocation if it is not. Firms are forced to underprice their IPOs in order to 
compensate uninformed investors for this adverse selection. One problem with the winner's 
curse explanation is that it could be easily avoided. Underwriters could, for instance, 
reduce the adverse selection problem by offering IPOs only in pools or by agreeing to 
withdraw an issue or compensate uninformed investors if demand from informed investors 
is not forthcoming (Ritter (1987)). 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) investigated how investment bankers use indications of 
interest from their client investors to price and allocate new issues. They modeled the 
process as an auction constructed to induce asymmetrically informed investors to reveal 
what they know to the underwriter. They concluded that by using their access to investors 
to collect information, underwriters can reduce IPO underpricing. 
On the other hand, signaling theories advocated that the information asymmetry is due to 
the firm owner knowing more than investors, and high-quality firms whose quality is not 
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otherwise known by the market intentionally underpriced the IPO in order to "leave a good 
taste in investors mouths", so that future underwritings from the same issuer could be sold 
at attractive prices. This is also the prevalent explanation on Wall Street. 
Under the signal theory, since the earnings and the cash flows in urban transit sector are 
relatively more predictable than other cyclical industries, say steel and petrochemical, the 
severity of information asymmetry between investors and the issuers in this sector should 
be less than other industries. Therefore there should be less underpricing premium within 
this sector since the issuers do not have to intentionally underprice the IPO in order to 
distinguish themselves from low-quality firms. The investors could get a good idea of the 
future earnings based on the regulated fare, steady growth rate of demand, as well as the 
stable profit margin. 
We investigated the IPO premium, which is defined as the premium of the close prices of 
the listed date over the IPO prices, for the seven stocks in the China A-share market, as 
well as the thirteen stocks in other foreign stock markets. We found that while the IPO 
premiums for the foreign stocks are relative low, which is in accord with our hypothesis, 
investors still enjoyed high IPO premium from the seven stocks in China A-share market. 
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I Table 17； IPO Premiums for Urban Transit Sector 
International Stocks Local Stocks 
Company Stock Market IPO Premium Company IPO Premium 
Kowloon Motor bus Hong Kong 11.0% DaZhong Transportation 32.6% 
AMS Public Hong Kong 1.9% QiangSheng Holding 10.2% 
Kwoon Chung bus Hong Kong 30.6% BaShi Group 66.7% 
MTR Corp Hong Kong 30.6% ShenTong Subway -26.7% 
Chunil Express South Korea 15.0% Beijing Bus Group 46.4% 
Shinki Japan 3.0% HaiBo Co. Ltd. 190.9% 
Daiwa Japan 5.0% Nanjing Zhongbei 77.7% 
Hokkaido Japan 10.0% 
Centris multipersada Indonesia 0.0% 
Comfortdelgro Singapore 12.0% 
Sbs transit Singapore 13.0% 
National express U.K 3.5% 
First group UK 21.0% 
Stagecoach U.K 12.0% 
Southern vectis U.K 11.0% 
Telling golden U.K 10.7% 
Laidlaw U.S 15.0% 
Average 12.1% Average 56.8% 
Sources: Bloomberg 
The possible reasons that the seven stocks in A-share market had great IPO premium may 
include: 
1) The seven companies all used to be SOEs，to which government has to provide great 
subsidy. Therefore most of them have the chance to get listed before mid 1990s, 
exactly the fanatic period of A-share market. 
2) The lack of institutional investors in A-share market may results in more information 
asymmetry relative to the foreign market even for the same "defensive sector". 
The real reasons for this divergence is open to further research. 
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3 Explanatory Variables for Stock Returns 
In this part, we will examine whether the stock returns of the urban transit sector and the 
market as a whole are related with some state variables. Based on the literature, we test two 
categories of state variables, those related to risk premium and those related to expected 
cash flows, respectively. The main hypotheses are 1) whether variation through time of 
expected returns on stocks of the urban transit sector and the China A-share market is 
related to some macroeconomic variables, and 2) whether the explanatory power of the 
state variables for stock returns of urban transit sector, as a defensive sector, is different 
from for the whole stock market. We will fist examine the related literature, especially the 
state variables they have been used and their results. Then we will explain the hypothesis 
based on the literature and the institutional background of urban transit sector. The data we 
used and the empirical results will be elaborated afterwards. 
3.1 Literature Review 
There is mounting evidence that stock returns are predictable. Asset's covariances with 
those state variables affects its expected returns is verified in Merton (1973) and Cox, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). In time-series analyses, Fama and Schwert (1977), Rozeff 
(1984), Shiller (1984), Keim and Stambaugh (1986)，Flood, Hodrick，and Kaplan (1986), 
Campbell (1987), Fama and Bliss (1987)，and Fama and French (1988b) all find that 
short-term interest rates, expected inflation, dividend yields, and lagged stock price ratios 
(or returns) can predict the expected returns of bonds and stocks. Some argue that 
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predictability implies market inefficiency. Others contend that it is a result of rational 
variation in expected returns. Here we will review three papers about the relation between 
state variables and the stock returns. 
The research of Fama and French (1989) indicates that expected excess returns on 
corporate bonds and stocks move together. Dividend yields, commonly used to forecast 
stock returns, also forecast bond returns. Predictable variation in stock returns is also 
tracked by variables commonly used to measure default and term premium in bond returns. 
The default factor they used is the difference between the yield on a market portfolio of 
corporate bonds and the yield on Aaa bonds, while the term premium variable (the term 
spread) is the difference between the Aaa yield and the one-month treasury bill rate. The 
regression slopes for the default spread, dividend yield and term spread are positive. Since 
all the three variables are negatively related to the business condition, this result illustrated 
that expected returns are low when times are good and higher when they are poor. 
They utilized consumption smoothing theory to explain this phenomenon. Like the 
permanent-income model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1955) and Friedman (1967)，the 
asset-pricing models predict that consumption depends on wealth rather than current 
income. When income is high in relation to wealth, investors want to smooth consumption 
into the future by saving more. If the supply of capital-investment opportunities is not also 
unusually large, higher desired savings lead to lower expected security returns. Conversely, 
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investors want to save less when income is temporarily low. Again, without an offsetting 
reduction in capital-investment opportunities, lower desired savings tend to push expected 
returns up. From this perspective，they argue that variation in expected returns opposite to 
business conditions is consistent with modem asset-pricing models. 
Chen (1991) studied the relation between changes in the state variables and changes in the 
macroeconomy. Except for the three variables that Fama and French (1989) also used, there 
are another two state variables involved in Chen's analysis, namely, lagged yearly 
production growth rate and the short-term interest rate represented by T-bill rate. The 
results show that expected return of stock market has positive relation with dividend yield, 
default premium and term factor, which is the same as Fama and French (1989) found, 
while negatively related to short-term interest rate and industrial production growth rate. 
Based on the regressions of the GNP growth rate over successive past and future quarters 
on the state variables, he finds that an above average dividend yield or default spread is 
associated with lower than average growth in GNP and consumption in the recent and the 
immediate future quarters. An above average term structure or below average one-month 
T-bill rate is associated with higher than average growth of GNP and consumption in the 
next four to six quarters. Fama and French (1990) also observe that T-bill rates tend to be 
low in a business contraction. An above average past production growth is associated with 
higher current growth of GNP and consumption. 
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Since the market excess return is negatively correlated with recent economic growth and 
positively correlated with expected future economic growth, these results offer 
straightforward interpretation of the evidence on the forecasts of the market excess return 
by state variable via their forecasts on the marcoeconomy. 
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) employ a simple theoretical guide to help choose likely 
candidates for pervasive state variables. Based on the discounted dividend model, they 
divide the macro economic variables, which should systematically affect stock market 
returns, into two categories, one related to risk premium, and another related to cash flow. 
Variables in the first category include short-term interest rates, term structure and default 
premium. On the demand side, they believe that changes in the indirect marginal utility of 
real wealth, perhaps as measured by real consumption changes, will influence pricing, and 
such effects should also show up as unanticipated changes in risk premium. On the other 
hand, variables in the second category include industrial production growth, unanticipated 
inflation, the change in expected inflation, as well as the changes in oil prices. The series of 
expected inflation they used is obtained from Fama and Gibbons (1984). 
Although their final goal is to make cross-sectional test to find out whether these are 
important economic factors in determining equilibrium expected returns on securities, as an 
intermediary result, they do find that monthly growth of industrial production, changes in 
expected inflation, unexpected inflation, default premium and term structure factors are 
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significantly related to stock returns on a time-series basis. Furthermore, they also find that 
neither the aggregate consumption nor the oil price risk is separately rewarded in the stock 
market. 
3.2 Hypothesis 
Based on Fama and French (1989) and Chen (1991)，the stock market returns should 
negatively relate to the current business condition, while positively related to the future 
business condition. Because some state variables are related to the business condition, they 
show some power in forecasting the stock market returns. 
The term factor, represented by the yield difference of long-term government bond and 
T-bill，default premium, represented by the yield difference of low-rated corporate bond 
and Aaa corporate bond, and dividend yield are positively related to stock market return 
since they are all negatively related to the current business condition, while positively 
related to the future business condition to different extent. Short-term interest rate, 
represented by the yield of T-bill, is negatively related to the stock market returns. Our first 
hypothesis is that the variation through time of expected returns on stocks of the urban 
transit sector and the China A-share market are also related to these state variables, in the 
same manner. 
On the other hand, according to Chen, Roll and Ross (1986)，any systematic variables that 
affect the risk premium or that influence dividends would influence stock returns. They 
argue that since stock prices can be written as expected discounted dividends: 
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- 平 ’ （1) 
where c is the dividend stream and k is the discount rate. This implies that actual returns in 
any period are given by 
dp ^c d[E{c)] dk c , , � 
— + — = 1——. (2) 
P P E{c) k p 
It follows that the systematic forces that influence returns are those that change discount 
factor, k, and expected cash flows, E(c). 
Variables that influence discount factor include short-term interest rates, term structure and 
default premium, for which they used the same measurement as FF (1989) and Chen (1991) 
did. In addition, another variable they also used is real consumption changes, because they 
argue that changes in the indirect marginal utility of real wealth will influence pricing, and 
such effects should also show up as unanticipated changes in risk premium. The systematic 
forces that influence expected cash flows include industrial production growth, 
unanticipated inflation, the change in expected inflation, as well as the changes in oil 
prices. 
Based on this model, our second hypothesis is whether the explanatory power of the state 
variables for stock returns of urban transit sector, as a defensive sector, is different from for 
the whole stock market. Since the cash flows from the listed companies in urban transit 
sector is more predictable based on the institutional background, the factors that would 
induce the stock price changes should be more related to the risk premium than to the 
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expected cash flow, compared with the A-share market as a whole. 
3.3 Data 
There are two dependent variables, returns of the portfolio of seven A-share urban transit 
stocks and returns of the A-share market as a whole. Our tests attempt to measure and 
interpret variation in expected returns for return horizon of one month. Since three of the 
seven stocks got listed before 1996, three of them got listed in 1996, while the last one in 
2001，our sample range is from September 1996 to September 2005, totally 108 monthly 
return data. 
If P(r) denotes the price of any urban transit stock at date t (we use the end date of every 
month), then the monthly return for this stock is 
PTR{t) = log, P{t) - log, P(t - 30) (3) 
The price data was obtained from Bloomberg, which has been adjusted to remove the 
dividend effects. And the value-weighted monthly return for the seven-stock urban transit 
portfolio is 
7 
^MC,(0 * PTR{t) 
VWPTRit) = ^ (4) 
i=l 
where MC/fy denote the end-of-month market capitalization for the 产 stock in this 
portfolio. 
Since six of the seven urban transit stocks are listed in Shanghai Exchange, while one is 
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listed in Shenzhen Exchange, we use the value-weighted comprehensive indexes of 
Shanghai Exchange and Shenzhen Exchange stocks, from Bloomberg, to represent the 
behavior of market returns. If Ish (t) and Isz (t) denote the index value of the Shanghai 
Exchange and Shenzhen Exchange at date t (we use the end-of-month date), then the 
monthly returns for the market is 
MRsm (0 = loge IsH (0 - log, IsH {t - 30) (5) 
The index value data was obtained from Bloomberg. And the value-weighted monthly 
return for the Shanghai market and Shenzhen market is 
VWMR(t) 二 MCsh (0 * (0 + MCsz (0 * MR,, jt) 
M C , „ { t ) + M C s A t ) ( 6 ) 
where MCSH(0 and MCsz(t) denote the end-of-month market capitalization of Shanghai 
Exchange and Shenzhen Exchange. 
As for the explanatory variables, we take into account of the variables used by the above 
three paper, and finally we use two kinds of data, those related to risk premium and those 
related to expected cash flow. Due to the incompleteness of the bond market in China, we 
cannot get all the data that the literature has ever used. 
A. Related to Risk Premium 
L Term Structure 
To identify variation in term or maturity premiums, Fama and French (1989) used the yield 
difference between the Aaa corporate bond and the one-month treasury bill rate to represent 
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the term structure, while Chen (1991) and Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) used the yield 
difference between 10-year government bond and the one-month treasury bill. 
In China market, however, one-month government bond does not exist, and the saving rate, 
which could also be thought of as risk free, is subject to regulation and is relatively fixed 
within one period. We finally turn to the seven-day intra-bank government-bond repo rate 
and use the difference between the time t yield on the 10-year government bond and the 
seven-day intra-bank government bond repo rate as the term spread, TERM. 
TERM{t) = LGB{t) - RR{t) (7) 
The data are from CEIC, and this variable can be thought of as measuring the unanticipated 
return on long bonds. Since equity return is another kind of long-term return, this should 
also have something to do with the returns of stock market. In addition, since this variable 
is more related to risk premium than to expected cash flow, the return of urban transit 
portfolio should be more related with it than that of the whole market. 
it Risk Premium 
To capture the effect on returns of unanticipated changes in risk premium, Fama and 
French (1989) and Chen (1991) used two variables, one is the difference between the yield 
on a market portfolio of corporate bonds and the yield on Aaa bonds, and the other is 
dividend yield ratio, that is, the aggregate dividend of the whole market divided by the 
market capitalization of the whole market. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) also used the 
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difference of Baa or below bond portfolio return and the long-term government bond return 
to represent the default risk. 
Although default factor is commonly used in the literature as explanatory variable, to our 
regret, we cannot find appropriate default premium measures for our research. First, in 
China market, there are no low-quality corporate bonds. Due to the strict regulation on the 
issuing and transaction of corporate bond, presently the corporate bond in China market are 
all rated above AA, and the issuers are mainly large SOEs. The usage of corporate bond is 
somewhat like the municipal bond in U.S., that is, in the infrastructure construction. Due to 
the high quality of corporate bond, the yield is sometimes even lower than the government 
bond. Second, in China, there is no such database that ever calculated the dividend yield 
for the whole market. Since adding the dividend every month for more than 1000 stocks is 
a demanding work, we choose not to use this measure. 
Hi. Short-term Interest Rate 
Chen (1991) used the T-bill rates to stand for short-term interest rates, which he found to be 
negatively related to the future growth of GNP and consumption, and hence negatively 
related to the stock market returns. 
As we have explained above, in China market, one-month government bond does not exist, 
and the saving rate, which could also be thought of as risk free, is subject to regulation and 
is relatively fixed in one period. Therefore we finally use the seven-day intra-bank 
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government-bond repo rate as the short-term interest rate. 
IV. Consumption Per Capita Change 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) believe that changes in the indirect marginal utility of real 
wealth, perhaps as measured by real consumption changes, will influence pricing, and such 
effects should also show up as unanticipated changes in risk premium. However, they 
finally find that real consumption change is not separately rewarded in the stock market. 
We also examined a time series of percentage changes in real consumption, CG First, we 
construct the series of monthly per capita consumption by dividing the series of monthly 
total retail sales of consumer goods by the monthly population series. The two series of 
data are obtained from CEIC. 
C P C { t ) = ^ ( 8 ) � ’ PP{t) � , 
Because the monthly total retail sales of consumer goods show strong seasonal tendency, 
we construct the yearly growth rate of consumption per capita in every month as follows. 
CG{t) = log, CPCit) - log, CPC(t -12) (9) 
B. Related to Expected Cash Flow 
L Monthly Inflation Rate 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) argue that changes in the expected rate of inflation would 
influence nominal expected cash flows. To the extent that pricing is done in real terms, 
unanticipated price-level changes will have a systematic effect, and to the extent that 
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relative prices change along with general inflation, there can also be a change in asset 
valuation associated with changes in the average inflation rate. If l(t) denotes the monthly 
inflation rate, the series of expected inflation, t -1] they used is obtained from 
Fama and Gibbons (1984). And they found that the unanticipated inflation, defined as 
UI{t) = 1(f) -E[I{t)\ t-\] , and the change in expected inflation, defined as 
DEI (J) = E[I{t + 1) / ] - E[I(t)\ t -1] have something to do with the stock market returns. 
Unfortunately, there is no such series of expected inflation available in China market. Since 
inflation could induce relative price change, which would influence the expected cash 
flows, we use the CPI obtained from CEIC every month to represent the inflation rate. 
/(0 = ( c 尋 ( 1 0 ) 
Since fares of urban transit do not increase together with inflation rate, but rather in a 
lagged and structural changed fashion, inflation should have minimum effect on the 
expected cash flows of urban transit sector, and hence less effect on the stock returns of the 
urban transit sector than on the market returns. 
iL Monthly Growth Rate of Industrial Production 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) believe that changes in the expected level of real production 
would affect the current real value of cash flows. If JP{t) denotes the industrial production 
in month t, the monthly growth rate is 
MP{t) = log, IP{t) - log, IP{t -1) (11) 
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where the series of data is obtained from CEIC. 
UL Yearly Growth Rate of Industrial Production 
Chen (1991) used lagged industrial production growth over the previous 12 months as an 
indicator of the current health of the economy, and found this series is negatively related to 
the stock market return. The monthly series of yearly growth rates was examined because 
the equity market is related to changes in industrial activity in the long run. 
YP{t) = log, IPit) - log, IP{t -12) (12) 
IV. Change of Oil Prices 
It is often argued that oil prices must be included in any list of the systematic factors that 
influence stock market returns and pricing. However, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) find that 
the oil price risk is not separately rewarded in the stock market. 
We formed the OG series of realized monthly first differences in the logarithm of the WTI 
(West Texas Intermediate) crude petroleum series. 
OG(t) = log, Wrm — log, WTI(t -1) (13) 
Since fuel cost actually occupy twenty-five to thirty percentage of the total costs of bus 
operation firms, the oil price changes should affect the expected cash flows and the 
expected returns of the urban transit portfolio. 
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3.4 Results and Interpretations 
We measure the variation of expected returns with linear regression of returns on the 
forecasting variables, like what the above authors did, and we also try to compare the 
forecasting power of the explanatory variables, especially those related to risk premium 
and those related to expected cash flows, for urban transit stock portfolio and the whole 
stock market. First, we analyze the characteristics of every series, especially from 
time-series perspective, that is, whether the series is integrated and autocorrelated. Then we 
examine the relationship of every explanatory variables with the two dependent variables 
separately, especially examine whether the leading or lagging explanatory variables have 
something to do with the stock returns. Based on this analysis, we finally run the multiple 
regressions between the two dependent variables and the seven independent variables 
separately, and offer the explanation for the result of the multiple regression. 
3.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
We take the following four steps in this part: 
We plot every series against time, and get the basic statistics, including mean, 
standard deviation, maximum value, minimum value, skewness and kurtosis, etc.; 
We conduct formal tests for unit roots and deterministic time trends, using ADF 
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller) methodology. We first begin with the full model - which 
includes a constant, a time trend and possible lags that are to adjust for serial 
correlation in the residuals. The model has the form: 
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k 
Ay,=以0 + yyt-x + 〜 , + S A A y , 一 i + 〜 （i4) 
/•=i 
Then we use the F-statistics to determine whether constant and time trend should be 
included in the model. In each model, appropriate lag length is chosen by using the 
General-to-Specific method. That is, we begin with 12 lags and proceed to fewer lags 
until the /-statistic on coefficient is greater than 1.645 (5% significance level) in 
absolute value, while 厂value on p. for i > k is less than 1.65 in absolute value. 
Besides, we use the critical value for sample size 100 in Dickey Fuller table for this 
test and use 5% significance level. Our results show that the seven explanatory 
variables and the two dependent variables could all pass the integrated test, that is, 
they are all 1(0); 
• We calculate the ACF/PACF and the Q-statistic for each series, if the series is White 
Noise, the ACF/PACF should be small, and the Q-statistics should not be significant 
at 5 percent significance level; 
• We select appropriate ARMA model for those series that are not white noise. The 
model-selection criteria are as follows. Firstly, the t-statistics for all the coefficients 
should be significant at 5 percent level. Secondly, the residuals of the model should 
not be serially correlated, thus the Q-statistics should not be significant at five percent 
significance level. Finally, we use the AIC and SBC to select the best model. 
From Table 18，monthly rates of return of both urban transit portfolio and the whole market 
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are nearly serially imcorrelated, or White Noise, which is in accordance with the random 
walk hypothesis of stock price. 
The autocorrelations of the term factor, short-term interest rate, consumption growth, 
inflation, and yearly growth rate of industrial production are large at the first order lag, but 
tend to decay for longer lags. This suggests that they are autocorrelated but show some 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.2 Bivariate Analysis 
The correlation matrix between the seven explanatory variables is as follows. 
I Table 19； Correlation Matrix 
TERM ^ CG I m YP 
TERM 
RR -0.980 
CG 0.288 -0.143 
I -0.105 0.265 0.670 
MP 0.060 -0.055 -0.037 -0.017 
YP 0.264 -0.101 0.767 0.844 -0.015 
OG -0.194 -0.006 -0.073 0.026 
Note: TERM = difference between the time t yield on the 10-year government bond and the seven-day intra-bank 
government bond repo rate; RR = seven-day intra-bank govemment-bond repo rate; CG = yearly growth rate of 
consumption per capita in every month; I = yearly inflation rate for every month; MP = monthly growth rate of 
industrial production; YP = yearly growth rate of industrial production; OG = realized monthly first differences in the 
logarithm of the WTI (West Texas Intermediate) crude petroleum series. 
Not surprisingly, since TERM is the yield between long-term government bond and repo 
rate, it is highly negatively related with RR, while as yearly growth rate of industrial 
production, YP is positively related with consumption per capita growth and inflation rate. 
The above literature all utilized lagged state variables to forecast current stock returns. We 
also investigate whether this month's change in stock prices reflects changes in state 
variables one month or more time into the past. Before the multiple regressions between 
explanatory variables and stock returns, we first run the single regression of returns of 
urban transit portfolio and the whole market returns on state variables, with state variables 
lagged one month, three months (one quarter), six months (half a year), and twelve months 
(one year). 
VWR(t) = a + b* State Variables(t 一 lag) + e{t) (15) 
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The results, including the slope coefficient (b) and ？-ratio (in parentheses) for the 
corresponding regressions for urban transit portfolio and the whole market are reported in 
Table 20 and Table 21, respectively. 
I Table 20； Simple Regression of Monthly Return of Urban Transit Portfolio on State Variables 
VWPTR(t) = a + b* State Variables (t-lag) + e (t) 
Related to Risk Premium Related to Expected Cash Flow 
Lag TERM RR CG I MP YP OG 
1 -0.0004 0.0034 0.0396 0.2880 -0.0195 0.0444 -0.1379 
(-2.6458)* (1.9022)* (0.5376) (0.9045) (-2.5079)* (0.5655) (-2.7275)* 
3 -0.0001 0.0018 0.0553 0.2530 -0.0175 0.0258 -0.1469 
(-2.0459)* (1.0020) (0.7150) (0.9456) (-2.0482)* (0.3196) (-1.8137)* 
6 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0440 0.3228 0.0124 0.0230 -0.0430 
(-1.1458) (0.8644) (0.6589) (0.9917) (1.4301) (0.2755) (-0.5142) 
12 -0.0005 0.0013 0.0422 -0.1374 -0.0027 -0.0310 -0.0294 
(-0-3748) (0.7569) (0.5476) (-0.4493) (-0.3244) (-0.3888) (-0.3859) 
Note: This table presents the slope coefficient (b) and t-ratio (in parenthesis) for the correponding 
regression. VWPTR = the value-weighted monthly return for the seven-stock public transit portfolio; 
VWMR = value-weighted monthly return for the Shanghai market and Shenzhen market; TERM = 
difference between the time t yield on the 10-year government bond and the seven-day intra-bank 
government bond repo rate; RR = seven-day intra-bank government-bond repo rate; CG = yearly 
growth rate of consumption per capita in every month; I = yearly inflation rate for every month; MP = 
monthly growth rate of industrial production; YP = yearly growth rate of industrial production; OG = 
realized monthly first differences in the logarithm of the WTI (West Texas Intermediate) crude 
petroleum series. 
*: Significant at 5% level. 
I Table 21 ； Simple Regression of Monthly Return of Stock Market on State Variables 
VWMR(t) = a + b* State Variables (t-lag) + e (t) 
Related to Risk Premium Related to Expected Cash Flow 
Lag TERM RR CG I MP YP OG 
1 -0.0005 0.0023 0.0141 0.1872 -0.0166 0.0154 -0.1026 
(-0.4521) (1.4221) (0.2113) (1.6492) (-2.8658)* (0.2175) (-1.4156) 
3 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0272 -0.2461 -0.0072 -0.0384 0.0317 
(-0.2622) (0.0191) (-0.4096) (-0.8814) (-1.9538)* (-0.5484) (0.4436) 
6 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0094 -0.1361 -0.0142 -0.0264 0.0020 
(-0.2430) (0.0967) (-0.1404) (-0.4962) (1.6784)* (-0.3775) (0.0279) 
12 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0393 -0.2646 -0.0036 -0.0439 0.0502 
(-0.2234) (0.0930) (-0.5585) (-0.9467) (-0.5648) (-0.6006) (0.7191) 
Note: This table presents the slope coefficient (b) and t-ratio (in parenthesis) for the correponding 
regression. VWPTR = the value-weighted monthly return for the seven-stock public transit portfolio; 
VWMR = value-weighted monthly return for the Shanghai market and Shenzhen market; TERM = 
difference between the time t yield on the 10-year government bond and the seven-day intra-bank 
government bond repo rate; RR = seven-day intra-bank govemment-bond repo rate; CG = yearly 
growth rate of consumption per capita in every month; I = yearly inflation rate for every month; MP = 
monthly growth rate of industrial production; YP = yearly growth rate of industrial production; OG = 
realized monthly first differences in the logarithm of the WTI (West Texas Intermediate) crude 
petroleum series. 
*: Significant at 5% level. 
From the results, we could see: 
1) Consistent with Chen (1991) and our first hypothesis, monthly returns of urban transit 
portfolio is negatively related with monthly growth rate of industrial production and 
monthly oil price change, while monthly market returns is also negatively related 
with monthly growth rate of industrial growth. 
2) Although monthly return of urban transit portfolio is related to the term factor and 
short-term interest rate, the direction is different from the above literature. And 
monthly rate of return of the whole market has nothing to do with both the term factor 
and the short-term rate. The result is different from the above literature. Fama French 
(1989) and Chen (1991) both found that term factor is positively related with the 
market returns, while Chen (1991) found that short-term interest rate is negatively 
related with market returns. Fama French found that term factor tends to be low near 
business-cycle peaks and high near troughs, but due to the lack of short-term 
government bond and the incompleteness of the bond market, this may not be true in 
China market. The relationship between the term factor and the business condition 
requires further study. 
3) Monthly growth rate of consumption per capita, inflation rate, as well as yearly 
growth rate of industrial production have little explanatory power on stock returns, 
both the urban transit portfolio and the whole market, which is consistent with Chen, 
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Roll and Ross (1986). 
4) No matter the state variables have forecasting power on stock returns or not, 
generally the t-statistic tend to be smaller with the lagging time, that is, the 
forecasting power diminishes with lagging time. 
5) Consistent with the second hypothesis, no matter the t-statistic is significant or not, 
the explanatory power of the variables related to risk premiums, including term factor, 
short-term interest rate and growth rate of consumption per capita, for urban transit 
portfolio is significantly larger than for the market return. 
6) The explanatory power of the variables related to expected cash flows is mixed for 
the two dependent variables. Monthly growth rate of industrial production has more 
forecasting power on the returns of the stock market than on the urban transit 
portfolio, while change of oil price has more forecasting power on the urban transit 
portfolio. The possible interpretation for this is that since fuel costs occupy a large 
percentage of the operation costs for transit firms, the expected cash flow of the urban 
transit portfolio tends to be more related to the oil price change than the whole 
market. 
3.4.3 Multiple Regressions 
We finally run the multiple regressions of the two dependent variables on the seven state 
variables, with those state variables lagged by one month. The procedure is as follows. We 
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first run the regression on all the state variables, then we delete the variable with the most 
insignificant t-statistic, and run the regression again. After this round, we delete another 
variable with the most insignificant t-statistic. That is, we delete the insignificant variables 
one by one, and finally get the multiple regression equation. 
I Table 22； Multiple Regression of Monthly Return of Urban Transit Portfolio on State Variables 
TERM RR MP OG 
b -0.0074 0.4000 -0.3745 -0.1850 
t-ratio (-2.5071) (1.9664) (-2.0415) (-2.3194) 
r2 0.1068 
Note: This table presents the slope coefficient (b) and t-ratio (in parenthesis) with R^for the multiple 
regression. TERM = difference between the time t yield on the 10-year government bond and the seven-day 
intra-bank government bond repo rate; RR = seven-day intra-bank government-bond repo rate; MP = 
monthly growth rate of industrial production; OG = realized monthly first differences in the logarithm of 
the WTI (West Texas Intermediate) crude petroleum series. 





Note: This table presents the slope coefficient (b) and t-ratio (in parenthesis) with R f^or the 
multiple regression. MP = monthly growth rate of industrial production. 
The results are no big difference from the bivariate part. The stock return of the urban 
transit portfolio is related with two risk premium factors and two cash flow factors, while 
the market return is only related with the monthly growth rate of industrial production. The 
forecasting power of the state variables on urban transit portfolio, not surprisingly, is larger 
than the market return. 
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4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we make a comprehensive analysis on the urban transit sector in China 
A-share market. 
First we analyze the institutional background, including regulatory environment, market 
structure, as well as the business model. Since there is strict entry restriction, the oligopoly 
market structure could stabilize in the near future. Since the fare level is also subject to 
strict regulation, the steady growth rate of demand leads to steady growth of revenue for 
the transit firms. Because government offer subsidy for the increasing costs for transit firms, 
and taxi firms are just "renters", with costs for each vehicle relatively stable, the profit 
margins of the firms in this sector are relatively stable. 
Based on the institutional background, we analyze the stock market characteristics of this 
sector. The stable revenue growth and profit margin make the urban transit sector a 
"defensive" sector. Since the main capital expenditure of transit firms is to buy vehicle, and 
the depreciation could cover that, the free cash flow of these firms is relatively stable. And 
these firms are willing to pay a higher percentage of net income as dividend, which results 
in attractive dividend yield in China A-share market. 
According to the signaling theory about IPO underpricing, there should be less IPO 
underpricing for the urban transit sector, since the net income as well as cash flow of these 
firms are relatively easy to forecast. Although this seems to be true for urban transit firms 
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on other foreign markets, the seven urban transit firms in China A-share market still offer a 
large IPO underpricing. The behind reason is left to further study. 
Finally, based on the literature about the explanatory power of state variables on time-series 
stock market returns, we examine whether the variation through time of the stock returns of 
urban transit portfolio and the whole A-share market is related to some variables, and 
especially whether the stock return of urban transit portfolios is more related to the 
variables related with risk premiums, since the cash flow of this sector is relatively easy to 
forecast. 
Our results show that the stock return of urban transit portfolio is related to two risk 
premium factors, term premium and short-term interest rate，and two cash flow factors, 
monthly growth rate of industrial production and the change of oil price, while the stock 
return of A-share market is only related to the monthly grow rate of industrial production, 
which is in line with the hypothesis. 
However, we did not find the appropriate factor to stand for the default premium, which is 
widely used in the literature, and this is subject to further study. On the other hand, the term 
factor and short-term interest rate influence the urban transit portfolio in a different way 
from the literature, at the same time has nothing to do with the stock market returns, which 
could also be a subject of further study. 
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